The Brazilian Fiscal System in the 1990s: Equity and Efficiency under Inflationary Conditions by Coutinho, Mauricio C.
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON 
4 1 INSTITUTE OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES 
RESEARCH PAPERS. 
The Brazilian Fiscal System in 
the 1990s: 
Equity and Efficiency 
under Inflationary Conditions 
Mauricio Coutinho 

THE BRAZILIAN FISCAL SYSTEM 
IN THE 1990s: 
EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY UNDER 
INFLATIONARY CONDITIONS 
Mauricio C. Coutinho 
Institute of Latin American Studies 
31 Tavistock Square London WC1H 9HA 
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data 
A catalogue record for this book is available 
from the British Library 
ISBN 1 900039 1 X 
ISSN 0957 7947 
© Institute of Latin American Studies 
University of London, 1996 
Mauricio C. Coutinho is Professor of Economics at the Institute of Economics, 
University of Campinas. He was a Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of 
Latin American Studies in 1994-5. He has researched and written on Economics of 
the Public Sector and History of Economic Thought, and his present work applies 
a public finance perspective to the discussion of modern liberal reforms in Brazil. 
Acknowledgements 
I am indebted to Fabricio A. Oliveira and Ivo V. Pedrosa for helpful comments 
on a preliminary version. 

CONTENTS 
List of Tables vi 
List of Figures vii 
Introduction 1 
The fiscal structure under the 1988 Constitution 6 
The Brazilian federal experience in sharing revenues 10 
Inflation, fiscal routines and budgetary results 15 
Federal versus state revenues: overall performance 26 
Equity and allocation concerns: a preliminary statement 29 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Federal Transfers (FP) and Value Added Tax Revenues (ICMS), 
1990-91 11 
Table 2: Fundos de Participacao/Income Tax(IR) + Industrial Products 
Tax (IPI) 14 
Table 3: Federal Tax (FT), Finsocial (F) and Value Added Tax (ICMS) 
in Real Terms 26 
Table 4: ICMS - Annual Revenues in Real Terms, 1988-93 27 
Table 5: Federal Taxes - Yearly Amounts in Real Terms, 1989-93 28 
Table 6: Direct and Indirect Taxation in Real Terms 29 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Income Tax-Monthly Real Revenue, 1992-93 (Jan 92 = 100) 18 
Figure 2: Value Added Tax Revenue (ICMS) in Real Terms and Rate of 
Inflation, 1988-93 (Minas Gerais) 21 
Figure 3: Value Added Tax Revenue in Real Terms (ICMS) and Rate of 
Inflation, 1988-93 (Sao Paulo) 22 
Figure 4: Value Added Tax Revenue in Real Terms (ICMS) and Rate of 
Inflation, 1988-93 (all states) 22 
Figure 5: Income Tax in Real Terms and Rate of Inflation, 
1988-93 (Brazil) 23 
Figure 6: Industrial Products Tax Revenue in Real Terms and Rate of 
Inflation, 1988-93 (Brazil) 24 
Figure 7: Total Tax Revenue in Real Terms and Rate of Inflation, 1988-93 
(Brazil) 24 

The Brazilian Fiscal System in the 1990s: 
Equity and Efficiency under Inflationary Conditions 
Introduction 
The overwhelming impact of inflation on the Brazilian economy after 1982 
biased analysis of the tax system towards an exclusively macroeconomic 
approach. Analysts want to know whether there is a public deficit or not, at most 
being attentive to crude tax performance indicators such as the share of the tax 
revenues in the Gross Domestic Product. Since there are links between the fiscal 
budget and the financing of social security, and since the public debt links 
monetary and fiscal policies, there is room for controversy in the simple 
definition of budgetary equilibrium and, as a consequence, in the prescription of 
anti-inflationary policies. It is not difficult to understand the irresistible and 
endless appeal of these controversies, but it is not easy to accept the 
abandonment of the efficiency and distributive concerns that usually accompany 
traditional public finance and microeconomic perspectives - not least because 
they may contribute to the refinement of our view on public activities and shed 
some light on inflation problems. 
By contrast, what could be called the tax structure approach, especially 
prominent in constitutional reform periods, sometimes bypasses the anti-
inflationary aspects of budgetary practices. From time to time - and at a very 
secondary level until 1994 - social security financing dilemmas and a faint 
worry over redistributive and equity matters emerge, but the almost permanent 
issue of debate with this approach has been the distribution of fiscal 
responsibilities (on the revenue and on the expenditure sides) between federal, 
state and municipal government. However, high inflation itself impacts on tax 
performances in such a way as to subvert the constitutional rules that regulate 
equity and the distribution of the tax burden. 
By means of an analysis of the tax revenue performance within the period 
1989-93, this paper aims to provide further insights into the relation between 
inflation and fiscal structure in Brazil, stressing issues of distribution and equity. 
This paper gives: (a) a brief summary of the Brazilian fiscal system under the 
1988 Constitution; (b) a description of the federal experience in sharing 
revenues; (c) a comment on the effects of inflation on revenues and budgetary 
results; (d) an overview of the tax performance in the period 1988/93; (f) a 
review of equity and allocative effects. 
The text is based on budgetary data on federal and state taxes and, due to the 
lack of reliable information, leaves aside local government revenues. The poor 
reliability and the scarcity of fiscal data in general provide weak quantitative 
support for some conclusions. As a consequence, the text should also be seen as 
a preliminary enquiry into the Brazilian fiscal structure, at some points 
supported more by logical inferences and scattered information than by 
complete statistical evidence. 
The absence of concluding comments on the ongoing fiscal reform process, 
embodied in the 1995/96 constitutional revision, is due to the lack of clear 
outcomes as yet; however, the following introductory remarks include a general 
appraisal of the polemical issues in the current debate, designed to act as a 
backdrop for the 1988-93 period. 
As I will attempt to show - and this conclusion applies to a span of time 
larger than the period looked at here - the relationship between the 
constitutional text and subsequent economic performance is never 
straightforward in Brazil. It follows a quite tortuous pattern. Fiscal matters have 
been one of the favourite victims of a sort of trendy legal fetishism, which 
attributes to the law all the existing economic and social evils. This paper takes 
an opposite view: my purpose is to show why the legal rules, and especially the 
constitutional rules, do not explain everything, at least in the fiscal field. If this 
proves to be a sensible approach, the paper should also be taken as a 
recommendation for broader studies into the (limited) economic consequences 
of the legal setting. 
The year 1994 established a dividing line for the tax system proposed by the 
1988 Constitution. On the one hand, the enduring stability of prices, resulting 
from the Real Plan (Piano Real), strongly influenced the performance of 
budgetary revenues and expenses. On the other hand, and apart from the 
stabilisation programme itself, the Fundo Social de Emergencia (FSE), a fiscal 
device created prior to the decisive phase of the Real Plan, transformed the 
distribution of fiscal revenues among the Union, the states and the 
municipalities, in favour of the Union.1 Both factors contributed to put aside the 
immediate risks of budgetary deficits, lowering the fiscal constraints on 
stabilisation. Besides, the FSE has meant, in a sense, the end of the controversial 
state-federal balance achieved under the 1988 Constitution.2 
Several factors favoured central government in the first year following the 
launching of the Real Plan. To the end of inflation, which eliminated the losses 
1 A detailed description of the Brazilian tax structure and revenue-sharing 
practices is presented below. The FSE, established by the Revisional Constitutional 
Amendment 01/94 and enforced in the same year, spared from the constitutional tax 
transfers a share corresponding to 20% of the Tax on Industrial Production, and smaller 
percentages in the case of income tax. Besides, it increased the income tax burden and 
created additional sources of revenue on behalf of the Union. Under the name of Fiscal 
Stabilisation Fund, and with minor changes, the FSE was prolonged by Congress at the 
beginning of 1996. 
2 State-federal balance and revenue-sharing are discussed in Section 2. 
Approximately 80% of the FSE resources were to be obtained through redistribution, in 
favour of the Union, of amounts previously in the hands of states and municipalities. 
provoked by the lag in tax collection, must be added a decisive set of events: the 
increase in imports (and in import tax revenues), new legislation altering income 
tax paid by legal entities, and the end of the legal questioning of the 
Finsocial/Cofins.3 These generated revenues that more than compensated for the 
loss created by the expected end of the provisional Tax on Financial 
Transactions; altogether, they guaranteed a 9.2% boost to the overall federal tax 
revenues in the first semester of 1995, compared to the same period in 1994. 
Most importantly, this positive impact was not outweighed by the symmetrical 
negative salary-bill shock, typical of stabilisation periods, since the URV (a kind 
of transitory quasi-currency, preparatory to the launching of the new currency) 
had already indexed all salaries from March 1994 onwards.4 
Although presented as an emergency stabilisation mechanism, the FSE also 
addressed the core of the Brazilian state-federal problem. A commonly held 
view attributes part of the explanation for price inflation to the 1988 
Constitution, under the motto The constitution has decentralised the revenues 
but not the duties'. As a matter of fact, there is strong evidence to the contrary. 
This paper will show that the federal government soon recovered its previous 
position in the overall revenue balance; additionally, (sparse) evidence on the 
increasing burden of social expenditures - health care, education - to states and 
municipalities calls even further into question the received wisdom.5 In any 
case, one way or another, the quest for a new state-federal balance has been 
addressed by the FSE. 
Furthermore, the federal government has hinted at the removal of some 
efficiency-hindering aspects of the Constitution in a milder way. By far the most 
important political initiative in this direction is a multi-stage proposal for 
eliminating inconsistencies in the current Value Added Tax (VAT) system. 
The most critical points in the current system concern interstate sales taxes 
and the states' degree of autonomy to establish separate taxing policies 
(including exemptions, percentages etc.).6 Presently, the interstate sales are 
taxed according to a double criterion, which combines origin and destination: 
The FINSOCIAL is a special tax, established in 1982 by means of an executive 
decree, that falls on the gross sales of private and public enterprises. Since its inception 
the percentage has been increased from 0.5% to 2.0%, which constitutes a considerable 
tax burden. Under the name of COFINS it has been one of the main sources of revenue 
in the federal budget (in 1995 it was second only to income tax). 
4 Increased real salaries still threatened the budget equilibrium in 1995, especially 
at the state level, but they were not produced by the end of inflation itself. 
5 In 1994 and 1995, the federal government cut its disbursements, sacrificing 
investments and, especially, the payment of 'social' budgetary headings (e.g. public 
health, education). Transfer commitments to the states were not honoured by the Union, 
and states and municipalities faced intense pressure on their budgets. 
6 The Brazilian tax system is peculiar in putting the Value Added Tax (ICMS), its 
most important source of revenue, under state responsibility. See below for a specific 
discussion . 
one part of the tax burden applies to the territory where the goods are produced, 
and the other part of the tax is collected by the states where the goods are 
consumed. This division creates ample opportunity for tax evasion,7 and makes 
it impossible to receive a full tax exclusion in the case of goods sold to other 
states as inputs for exported goods. In its turn, the constitutional allowance for 
autonomous rules and procedures has stimulated fiscal inter-state wars. 
The project under discussion intends to introduce a pure destination 
criterion, and to eliminate the possibility of fixing differentiated state policies 
for VAT. Additionally, it attempts to exempt the taxation of inermediate goods, 
capital goods and exports, in order to approximate the ICMS to a consumption-
based Value Added Tax, so stimulating exports and investment. In its first stage 
(to 1997), the proposed arrangement envisages the elimination of part of the 
states' autonomy in establishing Value Added Tax policies, and the assurance of 
a tax relief to exports and intermediate goods. Compensatory mechanisms for 
countervailing the revenue losses caused by the relief are a delicate point of 
discussion but, since the governors have in 1996 finally accepted the cancelling 
of the states' debts as a proper compensation for the ICMS losses, it seems that 
a new deal is possible. This deal involves an exchange of potential revenue for a 
mix of debt cancelling and federal cash compensation, in unspecified 
proportions. Its impact on the overall balance of revenues and debts is not clear, 
because the limits to cash compensation are an open matter. The second stage of 
the agreement, which includes a full destination principle to apply from 1999 
on, in still under discussion. 
Of course, a lot of political quibbling is expected, because the Senate 
dislikes any restriction on the states' autonomy for implementing ICMS 
incentives (exemptions, favoured percentages) and, besides, both the exemption 
of export and intermediate goods and the imposition of a pure destination 
criterion imply losses for the main states. A success in the first round of 
negotiations, in 1996, does not assure the continuity of the process through to 
the full acceptance of a pure destination principle. The exemption of exports and 
intermediate goods involves a states-Union bargain, and it is not impossible to 
envisage new solutions within the complex states-Union agenda. Yet adoption 
of a destination principle involves an entirely redistributive interstate tug of war, 
devoid of compensatory rules, and unless a new political federative agreement is 
reached it seems difficult to have it implemented. 
Other issues within the fiscal reform agenda, whether involving 
constitutional changes or not, have progressed at a faster pace. New legislation 
has closed some loopholes in the legal entities' income tax, projecting a 
considerable gain from 1996 on, and a renewed tax on financial transactions in 
7 Many internal sales tend to be recorded as exports to other states, in order to 
benefit from the origin state part of the tax only. It is difficult to inspect and eliminate 
such a widespread fraud. 
general is on the verge of approval.8 Finally, the federal government supports 
the approval of new legislation on Social Security, and although political 
circumstances imposed a retreat from its ambitious first draft, a trimming of part 
of public servants' benefits - a direct budgetary outlay - is expected to happen.9 
If we were to sum up the general features of the fiscal system after the 
launch of the Real Plan in 1994, and to assess the major outcomes of the 
'reforms' so far, it would be tempting to conclude that the federal government 
succeeded in increasing revenues, but failed to change the laws regulating the 
state-federal balance. It should be noted, however, that this failure is only 
apparent. There were changes in the real state-federal balance, either because 
the mere end of inflation suffices to alter the overall distribution of tax 
revenues,10 or because the 'provisional' FSE has proved to be an enduring 
device. Analysts looking for dramatic changes in the constitutional arrangements 
fail to realise that, at the end of the day, economic conditions and some 
(apparently) minor rules have already given way to new conditions in federal 
financing. 
These new conditions, detrimental to both states and municipalities, entail an 
inherent instability. The state-federal conflicts, typical of the Brazilian political 
scene, were temporarily attenuated by the general rise in revenues produced by 
stabilisation, but by the end of 1995 many states and municipalities faced severe 
budgetary constraints, due to recession and to high rates of interest.11 By the 
beginning of 1996, even federal revenues had begun to be severely affected by 
recession and the expenses affected by the soaring impact of debt servicing. 
Whenever critical budgetary conditions arise, negotiation is the key-word. 
Governors, representatives in Congress, the federal executive, engage in 
8 This tax reintroduces an already extinguished instrument, adopted by the 
previous government. Its incidence encompasses all the 'financial transactions', in the 
form of a small percentage applied to movements in bank accounts. 
9 The first draft of the social security reform envisaged a transition to a Chilean-
style system. The second draft gave up the ideas of a radical privatisation, but kept as a 
main target the transition to age clauses, instead of the current 'years of contribution' 
conditions for retirement. Finally, it seems that the relevant change to be expected has 
been restricted to the imposition of the age clause retirement exclusively to public 
servants. The private sector workers' social security stays almost as it was. The funding 
side of the social security equation has not been dealt with as yet. 
10 Stabilisation affects in a different way each type of tax and the real value of the 
transfers. 
11 The federal government insists on the limited effects of the increased rates of 
interest on the state's budgets, because political agreements have determined a ceiling on 
the servicing of debts. In fact, the ceiling transforms a part of this burden into an 
increasing degree of indebtedness, and not into an increasing disbursement. It should be 
remembered, however, that the agreement only applies to the long-term debts. States and 
municipalities also recur to very expensive (rates of interest above 8% a month) short-
term loans, which do not necessarily appear as liabilities at the end of the year - and 
hence in the balances - because they come to a zero position by December. These short-
term loans certainly represent a heavy burden on state and municipal budgets. 
political agreements supported by blatant pork-barrel politics. The 1996/1997 
period will probably be no exception to a familiar picture: the federal executive 
calls for fiscal adjustments in the lower levels of public administration, whereas 
governors and mayors ask for a less stringent monetary policy, negotiating case 
by case arrangements which include privatisation, support for bankrupted banks, 
federalisation of debts, new loans and waivers. 
In what concerns the public finance question, the Real Plan seems to mean a 
new turn of an old screw, in the sense that state-federal transfers remain an 
unsolved problem. In view of the fact that the federal pact does not rest on 
explicitly agreed (or explicitly imposed) clauses - the real federal rules are 
unwritten - changes in the legal environment seem to have a limited role in 
resolving the permanent federative crisis. The following and more detailed 
appraisal of Brazilian federal financing in a specific period is designed to 
illuminate these matters which, albeit under a new guise, are of an historical 
nature. 
The fiscal structure under the 1988 Constitution 
At least since the beginning of the Republican era, the Brazilian tax structure 
has reflected the federal character of the country. Although local government 
has always been the weakest part within the intergovernmental balance - a 
factor that began to change after the 1950s as a consequence of the urbanisation 
process - and despite the military and political strength of the federal 
government throughout the century, a pendular movement between the Union 
and the wealthiest states depicts the real balance of power in the Republican era. 
The tax structure is an essential part of this balance; as a general rule we may 
say that in authoritarian periods the Union subtracts revenues and the power to 
tax from states, the opposite happening in democratic periods. 
The dynamics of public finance within the last three decades are adequately 
described by this rule. One of the major economic features of the military period 
was the concentration of public revenues and taxing authority at Union level.12 
The democratisation process, which not coincidentally had as a formal starting 
point the return to direct governors' elections (1982), brought about an intense 
pressure in favour of fiscal decentralisation. The 1988 Constitution marks a 
peak point in this process, and the rearrangement of public revenues provided it 
stands in sharp contrast to the economic rules of the game under the military.13 
12 For an authoritative discussion of the fiscal reform under military rule, see 
Oliveira, F.A. A Reforma Tributaria de 1966 e a Acumulagao de Capital (B.Horizonte: 
Ed. Oficina de Livros, 1991) (2nd ed.). 
13 Two texts provide valuable information on the negotiations preceding the 1988 
Constitution as well as the main features of the tax system: Oliveira, F.A. Crise, Reforma 
e Desordem do Sistema Tributario Nacional (Campinas: Unicamp, 1992); Rezende, F. 
Of the many political lobbies that attempted to influence the fiscal outcomes 
of the new Constitution, by far the most successful one was the so-called 
'regional interests' lobby. If the 1988 Constitution did not represent a radical 
change in the list of taxes and competencies, the new distribution of revenues 
from the revenue-shared taxes were intended greatly to benefit states and 
municipalities at the expense of the Union. Before attempting a proper 
discussion of the new federal balance, however, it might be useful to stress the 
general features of the Brazilian post-constitutional fiscal structure: 
a. If we leave aside minor changes (e.g. fusion of similar taxes) and some 
transfers of less important taxes from one governmental sphere to another, the 
overall tax structure remained quite similar to that of the previous constitution. 
The Union has responsibility for Income Tax (IR), Import and Export Taxes, 
Taxes on Financial Transactions (IOF), Land Tax and an Industrial Products 
Tax (IPI) that mainly operates as a special inter-industry value-added tax 
heavily concentrated on cars, tobacco products, and beverages. The constitution 
has also allowed Congress to implement a new tax on property, known as the 
Wealth Tax, although this could not be implemented until 1995. 
The states kept as their main tax a Value Added Tax (ICMS), extended in 
order to include some services previously out of its range. Despite the efforts 
from technical staff, the ICMS was not transformed into an all-encompassing 
Value Added Tax, but it is the most resource-effective tax within the Brazilian 
fiscal structure. Additionally, an almost ineffective Death Tax and a very easily 
managed Vehicle Property Tax (IPVA) remained under the states' 
responsibility. 
The municipalities were given responsibility for the traditional urban estate 
taxes (Estate Property Tax and Estate Sales Tax) and a quite peculiar tax on the 
value (not the added-value) of a limited list of service activities (ISS), besides a 
newly created Fuel Retail Sales Tax (IVC). 
Stressing the main economic linkages, we may sum up as follows: the Union 
controls taxes that have a bearing on monetary, macroeconomic and 
international trade policies; the states operate an important Value Added Tax; 
the local governments enforce taxes related to urban policies. Although some 
minor distortions have remained and deeper attempts to rationalise the fiscal 
system failed - as exemplified by the attempt to include the whole list of 
services under the state Value Added Tax rule (with the consequent suppression 
of the municipal Services Tax) - the fiscal structure seems to have a rational 
basis in accordance with established standards. Last, but not least, insofar as the 
three levels of government have constitutionally defined sources of revenue and 
expenditure responsibilities, at first sight the Brazilian fiscal system seems to be 
well suited to the federal character of the country. 
and Afonso, J.R. A Reforma Fiscal no Processo de Elaboragao da Nova Constituigao 
(R.Janeiro: IPEA/INPES, Texto para Discussao n. 121, nov. 1987). 
It should be noted that the above inclusive list of taxes does not describe the 
full extent of general public revenues, since Brazilian law distinguishes between 
taxes ('impostos') and contributions ( ' con t r ibu tes ' ) , which are compulsorily 
enforced public revenues earmarked to specific expenses or transfers. From an 
economic point of view, the contributions may be seen as ordinary taxes, and 
under this legal heading are important resources, such as the Social Security 
Tax, Finsocial/Cofins (directed to welfare expenses) and the Education Tax 
('salario-educagao', a wage-bill tax aimed to fund basic education expenses), 
not to mention the Fundo de Garantia por Tempo de Servico (FGTS), which is a 
credit fund. Some of the contributions, such as the Education Tax, are shared 
with other layers of government on a regionally redistributive basis, but others 
are under the entire discretion of the Union. 
b. The roughly unchanged assignment of competencies does not mean that 
the 1988 Constitution did not favour states and municipalities. The main 
demand of governors and mayors during the pre-constitutional period was the 
enlargement of the so called Fundos de Participacao (FPE- states - and FPM -
municipalities), the Union funds constituted by percentages of both the Income 
Tax and the Industrial Products Tax to be transferred to states and 
municipalities. Rather than reinforcing the taxing capability within their spheres, 
governors and mayors tried to boost the state and municipal revenues by means 
of an enlargement of their share in the Union tax funds (and in the states' tax 
funds in the case of local governments). 
According to the 1988 Constitution, the municipalities should increase their 
share in ICMS from 20 to 25%. This change was intended to counterbalance the 
(finally not achieved) extinction of the Services Tax, with the consequent 
incorporation of all services under the state ICMS rule. The survival of the 
Services Tax within the local government sphere means that the enlarged ICMS 
percentage to be transferred represented an important net gain to municipalities. 
With regard to federal taxes, states and municipalities increased their share -
previously 17.5% in both cases - in the funds formed by Income Tax and the 
Industrial Products Tax (Fundos de Participacao) to 21.5 and 22.5%, 
respectively.14 
There are additional and less significant transfers: the state Vehicle Tax and 
the federal Land Tax are shared 50:50 with municipalities; the Income Tax and 
the Industrial Products Tax are also divided;15 not to mention shares in funds 
formed by 'contributions' instead of taxes.16 On the whole, these transfers imply 
14 A gradual increase of the shares was approved, so that the new shares would be 
fully implemented only in 1993. 
15 The Industrial Products Tax has 10% of its value transferred to exporters' states, 
as a compensation for the fiscal losses caused by exports. 
16 A more complete description of revenue-sharing mechanisms in Brazil is to be 
found in Appendix E to Shah, A. The Reform of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in 
that the Union's efforts to raise revenues are severely lessened by redistributive 
commitments; furthermore, the municipalities' and states' efforts to enforce 
their own taxes have faltered, since in most cases their major resources are 
provided by transfers. I will return to this point later, but as a good example we 
may refer to the several municipalities that have simply given up collecting the 
Urban Property Tax or Service Tax, because the transfers they receive are 
sufficient for their budgets. Irrespective of other consequences, to be further 
examined below, we may state that the redistributive profile that characterises 
the Brazilian fiscal system imposes strong constraints on the short-term 
management of fiscal policies by the Union and reinforces fiscal negligence at 
the local government level. 
c. The progressiveness of fiscal systems depends on factors - incidence, 
percentages, effective burdens - well beyond constitutional texts, and Brazil is 
no exception in this field. In general, we can see that the 1988 Constitution did 
not put the instruments best suited to achieve the redistribution of income and 
wealth in the Union's hands. The Wealth Tax, as already mentioned, is not yet 
legally defined, and this seems to be a never-to-be-implemented tax. The Land 
Tax has up to the present been a merely symbolic tax, although it could be 
transformed into an effective agricultural policy, rather than a redistributive, 
instrument. The Industrial Products Tax has a redistributive role, since its 
percentages are selective and cars in Brazil are still a luxury good; nevertheless, 
its main targets are tobacco and beverages, and it is designed to maximise 
revenue - the usual role of 'sin' taxes. The most effective fiscal instrument in 
the Union's hands to promote redistribution is the income tax, and its potential 
will be examined below. 
On the other hand, the states, and especially the municipalities, control fiscal 
instruments that are well designed to carry out redistributive tasks. If we assume 
that property taxes and taxes on estate sales are not negligible redistributive 
instruments, the roles of the Vehicle Tax, Urban Estate Tax and Estates Sales 
Tax stand out. The 1988 Constitution authorises (and even suggests) a 
progressive approach to property taxes, but states and municipalities exploit 
these opportunities in a very diffident way. As a matter of fact, local authorities 
can hardly overcome the political pressures against progressive taxation, 
strengthened by a culture of non-progressiveness that is deep-rooted in the 
whole system. As a first conclusion (to be further developed) one can say that 
the Brazilian system relies heavily on indirect taxes, leaving the enforcement of 
direct taxation largely up to local governments; this means the 1988 
Constitution has put strong fiscal redistributive responsibilities on the shoulders 
of the authorities least likely to be capable of performing them. 
Developing and Emerging Market Economies (The World Bank, Policy and Research 
Series 23, 1994). 
The Brazilian federal experience in sharing revenues 
As stated above, the 1988 Constitution reinforced the regional redistributive 
pattern of the fiscal system. Income Tax and Industrial Products Tax, the most 
important of the Union's fiscal resources,17 have become shared with states and 
municipalities in a proportion of 21.5 and 22.5%, respectively, and the 
municipalities' revenues heavily depend on the 25% redistributed share of each 
state's Value Added Tax. 
Revenue-sharing systems are usual in federal countries and many arguments 
can be cited in their support. First of all, given the existence of a limited number 
of economically relevant taxes, its enforcement at a specific administrative 
level, providing resources to other spheres through direct transfers, avoids 
double taxation of the same economic activities and 4tax wars' among sub-
national entities. If we think of the administrative burden of collecting taxes, this 
procedure has cost efficiency as an additional advantage. 
Besides, a strictly redistributive approach stresses the suitability of revenue-
sharing systems. Wherever the fiscal system is designed to effect an equalisation 
among different regions, clearly established rules for the division of taxes can 
openly state and more precisely assess the targets. In fact, the redistributive 
commitment is strong in Brazil, and the transfers are said to perform a regional 
levelling purpose. Although the states' VAT resources are redistributed to 
municipalities according to weak redistributive criteria,18 those states and 
municipalities handicapped in terms of their per capita income and of their own 
taxation capability are favoured to such an extent in the Fundo de Participaco 
system as to allow us to consider the redistribution of Union revenues as the 
most solid principle of Brazilian federalism.19 For many regions federal 
transfers are by far the most important tax revenues and form the basis of public 
administration, and not just supplementary resources, as shown below. 
Regional redistributive commitments notwithstanding, the transfers are not 
carried out according to clear-cut levelling criteria. The revenue sharing is not 
17 The Share of Income Tax plus Industrial Products Tax in the federal tax receipts 
was as follows: 1988:79%; 1989:85%; 1990:78%; 1991:84%; 1992:83%; 1993:84%. 
18 Only 25% of the amounts due to local governments can be shared in accordance 
with redistributive concerns; 75% are delivered in proportion to the value added within 
each municipal territorial base. 
19 This issue is regulated by the Complementary Law 62 (1989) and by the 
Complementary Law 71 (1992), which have stressed the redistributive shape of the FPE 
(IPI + IR transferred to states): 85% of the FPE is redistributed to states in North, 
Northeast and Central-west regions; the remaining 15% is redistributed to Southern and 
South-eastern states. The FPM (IPI + IR transferred to municipalities) does not have 
such an extreme redistributive character. A thorough analysis of the federal transfers, 
emphasising its distortions and failures in what concerns levelling effects, is provided by 
Castro, F. and Villela, L., Tecnicos CERF (Pernambuco, mimeo). 
guided by conventional rules concerning fiscal needs and/or fiscal capability 
and it could be argued that the present formula even contributes to boost 
financial discrepancies within poor states.20 That is, the redistributive 
commitments are not accompanied by meaningful levelling rules. The political 
existence of many states and municipalities - otherwise with no chance of 
survival as autonomous entities - seems to be the main purpose of the 
constitutional revenue-sharing system. 
Table 1 
Federal Transfers (FP) and Value Added Tax Revenues (ICMS), 1990-91 
1990 1991 1992 
FP ICMS FP/ FP ICMS FP/ FP ICMS FP/ 
Acre 15341 1780 8.62 67419 8096 8.33 735418 68729 10.70 
Amazonas 16096 46341 0.35 70720 186342 0.38 771169 1476588 0.52 
Para 38453 33548 1.15 168029 167857 1.00 1832131 1341333 1.37 
Rondonia 14482 12615 1.15 62870 48762 1.29 685674 483604 1.42 
Roraima 10715 1786 6.00 46901 8089 5.80 511640 84627 6.05 
Amapa 14865 1930 7.70 64694 9157 7.06 705730 94079 7.50 
Tocantins 22861 4568 5.00 101262 24385 4.15 1104228 278755 3.96 
Maranhao 44104 16220 2.72 196467 78900 2.49 2142228 892184 2.40 
Piaui 26728 9413 2.84 118222 49465 2.39 1289061 474434 2.72 
Ceara 48862 41797 1.17 218063 209311 1.04 2377493 2107634 1.13 
R.G.Norte 26140 14175 1.84 115125 62158 1.85 1255279 604626 2.08 
Paraiba 31690 16133 1.96 139963 77327 1.81 1526015 734419 2.08 
Pernambuco 47510 63131 0.75 209763 295466 0.71 2286951 2879972 0.79 
Alagoas 25347 15212 1.67 110207 68028 1.62 1201704 681873 1.76 
Sergipe 22292 12768 1.75 95233 61187 1.56 1238607 600213 2.06 
Bahia 73177 104243 0.70 320482 479309 0.67 3493715 5225086 0.67 
M.Gerais 71034 221421 0.32 313334 1106482 0.28 3414295 11377795 0.30 
E.Santo 13130 45341 0.29 57714 229088 0.25 629105 2267814 0.28 
RJaneiro 18270 223891 0.08 80351 1143463 0.07 875472 11733867 0.07 
S.Paulo 58373 964792 0.06 256701 4273085 0.06 2796563 43401615 0.06 
Parana 39128 132226 0.30 171524 609049 0.28 1869180 6210960 0.30 
S.Catarina 20820 85402 0.24 92179 359430 0.26 1004433 3857530 0.26 
R.G.Sul 37068 186721 0.20 162947 852697 0.19 1775590 9022023 0.20 
Goias 26164 63192 0.41 113321 292030 0.39 1235314 2999537 0.41 
M.Grosso 16628 31880 0.52 72275 146019 0.49 787960 1505496 0.52 
M.G.Sul 11236 33202 0.34 49648 180132 0.28 541194 1921657 0.28 
Note: ICMS and FP values in Cr$ 1000; FP/ICMS expressed as a ratio 
Source: Boletim do Banco Central do Brasil 
20 Castro and Villela, op.cit. and Shah, A. The New Fiscal Federalism in Brazil 
(Washington D.C: World Bank Discussion Papers 124, 1991), analyse the transfers and 
show they provoke horizontal imbalances within poor states and municipalities, despite 
their efficiency in transferring resources from more developed to less developed states. 
The relation between federal transfers (FP) and the states' Value Added Tax 
provides a rough description of the importance of federal transfers within state 
and municipal budgets. 
Table 1 uses December 12-monthly accumulated values as representative of 
annual revenue, which is not an accurate definition of real value in an 
inflationary situation, since it supposes a similar monthly distribution of nominal 
ICMS revenues within each state. The real relation between federal tax transfers 
and Value Added Tax resources might be misrepresented, but since the Fundo 
de Participacao/ICMS ratio is simply an indicator of fiscal dependence, other 
measurement criteria were not adopted. Subsequent tables will use superior 
standards of measurement. 
As Table 1 shows ,21 the variance is large. At one extreme, for Sao Paulo, the 
relation between federally transferred resources (Fundos de Participacao) and 
ICMS is 0.06 (i.e. six per cent); that is, federal resources are almost negligible 
in the budgets of Sao Paulo state and most of its municipalities. Yet, in the 
recently created state of Tocantins, the Fundo de Participagao transfers 
amounted in 1992 to four times the Value Added Tax resources. Since it 
depends almost entirely on federal funds, Tocantins may not by any means be 
taken as an example of fiscal autonomy. Half (13 out of 26) of the Brazilian 
states present a Fundo de Participacao/ICMS ratio greater than one, a clear sign 
of fiscal dependence.22 
There is no point in considering revenue-sharing systems incompatible with 
the political autonomy of sub-national layers, as the examples of Canada, 
Switzerland and Germany, among other countries, prove.23 The key problem in 
Brazil for many states and for a majority of local governments is to avoid the 
waste of their own tax resources, while continuing to respect the constitutional 
21 Table 1 relates the Fundos de Participagao resources transferred to states and 
municipalities (within each state) to the whole Value Added Tax (ICMS) revenue 
collected in each state in 1990, 1991 and 1992. It should be noted that the federal 
resources in these tables encompass resources transferred to both states and 
municipalities, being part (25%) of the Value Added Tax resources due to 
municipalities; that is, we are not dealing with exclusive state revenues. Nevertheless, as 
local governments' (and especially poor municipalities') budgets are almost entirely 
formed either by ICMS or by Fundo de Participacao transfers, it is not a serious 
distortion to omit municipal taxes collected locally. 
22 Nevertheless, even the most dependent entities have the political and 
administrative prerogatives of any other, not to mention a massive overrepresentation in 
the Federal Chambers, since the electoral rules for the Chamber of Deputies favour the 
less populated (and generally poorer) states and each state sends its representative to the 
Senate regardless of its size of population. 
23 For an approach to transfers in federal systems, see Bird, Richard Federal 
Finance in Comparative Perspective (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1985); Shah, 
The Reform of.., op.cit., presents an updated description of many revenue-sharing 
systems. 
requirement for well-defined and powerful taxes distributed to all layers. In fact, 
the states are responsible for (and the municipalities indirectly benefit from) a 
Value Added Tax, which, on the whole, is the most revenue-effective tax within 
the Brazilian tax structure. The recent foundation of new states and hundreds of 
new municipalities,24 despite the lack of fiscal sustainability and despite the 
obvious general losses (the revenue-sharing system is a zero-sum game and new 
entities imply additional administrative costs), suggests that the absence of 
economically rational criteria in the transfers is not an innocent flaw. Actually, it 
performs an important and well-defined role in the Brazilian political system, 
favouring clientelism, political misrepresentation and obscure relations between 
regional and local governments, Congress and the Union executive. 
If we were to consider only non-constitutionally framed transfers, the 
absence of clear-cut economic criteria has not been an impediment. Far from 
negligible transfers of fiscal revenues and federal credit have been given to 
states and local government by means of bilateral agreements (convenios), in 
accordance with quite unclear rules.25 This is a grey area in fiscal analysis, 
partly owing to the non-existence of reliable information, partly because credit 
allowances, which have an important role in political bargains, cannot be 
compared with grants in an hypothetical accounting of transfers. The budgetary 
crisis of the 1990s has contributed to a reduction in the importance of the so-
called 'negotiated transfers', but a comprehensive analysis of federal questions 
in Brazil cannot bypass the existence of such an important instrument of public 
financing and political management. 
Two of the main consequences of the Brazilian tax-sharing practices are the 
abandonment of control over administrative procedures and the financial losses 
caused by inflation. Despite their crucial interest in the federal revenues, the 
lower levels of government leave to the Union administrative control over 
Income Tax and Industrial Products Tax, and the same applies to municipalities 
in relation to the states' Value Added Tax. This means that states and 
municipalities have never had the least control over their most important 
revenue sources. Besides, although efficient fiscal routines should be backed by 
permanent cross-checks of economic information concerning income, properties 
and money flows, coordination among auditors and accountants is the exception 
24 The prevailing rules of tax-sharing stimulate territorial and political 
fragmentation. For a discussion of the sharing criteria, concerning municipalities, see 
Silva, V. A Constituigao de 1988 e federalismo tributario: impactos sobre as ftnangas 
municipals, Campinas (Unicamp, 1992) and Castro and Villela, op.cit. 
25 The non-constitutional transfers are generally referred to as 'negotiated 
transfers'. They are at the core of political dependence on federal government, but its 
mechanisms and effective amounts are to a large extent unknown. The best effort to 
measure and describe these transfers, unfortunately outdated, is Afonso, J.R.R. Despesas 
federals com transferencias governamentais: uma revisao de conceitos e diagndsticos 
(Brasilia: IPEA\IPLAN,1989). 
rather than the rule, which facilitates tax evasion at all levels.26 To begin with, 
there is not even a unified register of tax-payers, each administrative tier 
keeping its own records. 
On the other hand, financial losses provoked by inflation are additional and 
important outcomes of the tax-sharing system. The relation between inflation 
and fiscal effectiveness will be dealt with further on, but some of its features 
directly related to federalism may be mentioned here. The Constitution 
establishes the shares in terms of percentages, but not the effective division of 
revenues, which, under inflation, depends on practical rules (or on infra-
constitutional legislation) concerning the timing of the transfers. There is a 
variable time interval between tax collection and money transfers to the lower 
layers, and since all accounts are held in nominal terms, considerable losses 
arise from the acceleration of inflation. In the case of the Value Added Tax, 
each state has specific collection lags and redistributive schedules, and in many 
of them both the lags and the schedules are clearly damaging to municipalities. 
In the case of the Income Tax and Industrial Products Tax, the rule is uniform 
and the transfer lag is narrow (15 days on average), but this lag has to be added 
to the collection lag itself. The states and municipalities highly dependent on 
transfers suffer considerable losses because of the shared tax structure, in 
addition to the ordinary inflationary losses. 
Table 2 
Fundos de Participacao/Income Tax(IR) + Industrial Products Tax (IPI) 
FP/ FP/ FP/ FP/ FP/ 
Jan/89 31% Jan/90 24% Jan/91 33% Jan/92 40% Jan/93 43% 
Feb/89 42% Feb/90 26% Feb/91 40% Feb/92 34% Feb/93 42% 
March/89 31% Mar/90 48% Mar/91 39% Mar/92 37% Mar/93 44% 
April/89 29% April/90 21% April/91 31% April/92 31% April/93 40% 
May/89 26% May/90 57% May/91 44% May/92 38% May/93 32% 
June/89 31% June/90 41% June/91 44% June/92 42% June/93 51% 
July/89 21% July/90 42% July/91 36% July/92 37% July/93 44% 
Aug/89 24% Aug/90 35% Aug/91 46% Aug/92 46% Aug/93 44% 
Sept/89 26% Sept/90 45% Sept/91 49% Sept/92 32% Sept/93 39% 
Oct/89 17% 0ct/90 34% Oct/91 30% Oct/92 39% Oct/93 41% 
Nov/89 39% Nov/90 38% Nov/91 40% Nov/92 38% Nov/93 43% 
Dec/89 22% Dec/90 43% Dec/91 41% Dec/92 36% Dec/93 43% 
Source: Boletim do Banco Central do Brasil 
26 For instance, there is an obvious relationship between service sales (to be taxed 
by local governments) and commercial sales in general (to be taxed by states), but 
inspection procedures involving local governments and states are rare; the checking of 
property values is a primary procedure to enforce the personal income tax, but federal 
bureaucrats seldom use information on estate values that should routinely be collected 
by local authorities. 
To measure these losses precisely is a difficult task, but a rough overview of 
both the variance and the reduction of the effective states' and municipalities' 
shares can be achieved by comparing the sum of Income Tax (IR) and Industrial 
Products Tax (IPT) with federal tax transfers to states and municipalities 
(Fundos de Participacjao - FP - transfers). 
Table 227 - which shows effective monthly shares obtained from real 
monthly values - shows the extent of the variability. In only a few months in the 
period from January 1989 to May 1993 did the ratio come close to the 
constitutionally defined proportion (at least 44% in 1993); in most months there 
was a considerable difference between the constitutional rule and the effective 
results. Annual real values and proportions show the same inconsistency, largely 
due to inflation. No similar information concerning municipalities' shares in the 
Value Added Tax is available, but there is some evidence to suggest that in 
many states the distortions are even higher.28 
Inflation, fiscal routines and budgetary results 
As a general rule, tax revenues are negatively related to the speed of inflation, 
due to the time lag between tax-generation and the effective payment date - the 
so-called collection lag. The Brazilian inflationary experience has confirmed 
this rule, either through an upward change in the price index or when 
stabilisation plans suddenly break the inflationary trend. The temporary periods 
of low inflation, typical of the post-Cruzado period after 1986, have usually 
brought fiscal bonanzas to all levels of government, and especially to states and 
municipalities, thanks to the elimination of the inflationary losses associated 
with the collection lags and the lags inherent in the tax-sharing system 
(previously described). Graphs that help show this effect will be presented 
below, but they will provide just a broad and imprecise illustration, without 
aiming at the establishment of a causal relation between collection lags, rate of 
inflation and real revenues. Institutional regulations also have an impact on 
taxes under chronically inflationary circumstances and a brief commentary will 
27 Table 2 and the following tables were constructed from monthly nominal values, 
deflated by the General Price Index. This seems to be the best way to obtain real values, 
in the case of fiscal time series, but surprisingly this procedure - indexation of monthly 
values - is very seldom adopted. Almost all analyses of fiscal data rely on annual values, 
that is, the sum of monthly records held in nominal terms, deflated by yearly average 
indexes. Of course, this procedure distorts the economic results. It should be noted that 
since a great part of fiscal registers and official controls (including sharing ratios) are 
maintained in nominal terms, there is a complete divorce between legally defined 
percentages and real results. To conclude, accounting in nominal terms also falsifies 
budget execution. 
28 Redistributive shares guided by prospective revenue values, and not by 
effectively accounted (and past) amounts, are the only guarantee against heavy losses in 
inflationary periods. Sao Paulo has adopted such a mechanism, but this is a striking 
exception rather than the general rule. 
provide a sort of indirect qualitative framework for understanding the factors 
which affect fiscal performance. This commentary will set the paper apart from 
a long tradition of studies taking the collection lag as their point of departure,29 
an intentional commitment since I want to stress the importance of the many 
disturbing effects brought about by inflation and compensating policy measures 
(such as indexation). Although as important to the determination of the real 
fiscal revenues as the Tanzi effect' itself, these effects have been entirely 
neglected by analysts. 
Among the several factors that affect tax revenues, a strong stress should be 
put on indexation ('monetary correction') practices. It is well known that one of 
the main reasons for the official establishment of indexation rules at the 
beginning of the military period was the protection of the Treasury. Since taxes 
and debts are calculated in nominal terms, an absence of compulsory debt 
updating induces tax-payers to delay payments. The cost of occasional fines is 
easily counterbalanced by the devaluation of fiscal debts, as the pre-1964 
experience damagingly proved. 
However, the indexation of fiscal debts does not provide a full guarantee 
against delays. In the presence of high real interest rates, tax evasion, instead of 
borrowing money, becomes a rational financing strategy, provided the estimated 
probability of being caught by inspection is low.30 A mix of high level of 
interest rates and deterioration of inspection routines gives a boost to fiscal 
evasion, and indeed such a mix roughly describes the Brazilian events of the last 
decade. Since the tax-evader's chances of being caught are slender, not to pay 
the full due amounts, or to pay just enough not to raise the inspectors' 
suspicions, has been converted by tax-payers into a dominant strategy.31 
Tax debt indexation is an important first step, but it always represent a 
partial device and does not mean indexation throughout the fiscal system. 
Despite far-reaching experience in indexation, only at the beginning of the 
1990s were considerable efforts made to lessen the impact of inflation on real 
revenues, by means of a broad indexation of the tax accountancy and payment 
29 See in particular Tanzi, V. Inflation and the Personal Income Tax - an 
international perspective; Tanzi,V. Fiscal policy and economic reconstruction in Latin 
America (IMF,WIP 89\94); Choudhury, N. Fiscal Revenue and Inflationary Finance 
(IMF,WP 90\48). 
30 If a defaulting taxpayer is caught, the fines are heavy: non-voluntary payers are 
charged with fines that may produce a 50%, or even a 100%, increase in the real value of 
the debts. 
31 Excluding, of course, those who are automatically taxed, as wage-earners. The 
tax inspection services in many states concentrate their attention on a few hundred big 
firms. The rest of the firms and individuals are included in a sampling routine, in which 
the chances of being chosen are insignificant. So far, the evading strategy is fully 
available to a majority of Value Added Tax payers, to a majority of social security payers 
(firms, not individuals) and to a considerable number of (non-salaried) income tax 
payers. 
procedures. First of all, the fiscal authorities have been committed to closing the 
time intervals, shortening the gaps between the taxable moment and the payment 
date. Secondly, some payments have been fully indexed as from the first day of 
the month after the occurrence of the tax-generating activities. The taxpayers 
may be allowed to postpone their payments, but once the values are established, 
they are continuously updated.32 
Nevertheless, technical and legal barriers hindered the spread of full 
indexation throughout the system which, in addition to the inevitable inertia and 
frictions inherent in any collecting structure - clearing periods, bank 
intermediation, etc - provokes losses strictly due to time intervals. Indexation 
may be considered as comprehensive as possible for most taxes, but taxing 
practices always involve a great amount of accounting in nominal terms. The 
goods and services, as well as estates and properties in general, still have prices 
necessarily nominated in the official currency, and there remain lags between 
taxable events (selling, ownership) and tax accountings. These lags have 
negligible consequences under low inflation, but exert a considerable impact in 
a highly inflationary environment. We should not forget, on the other hand, that 
a great part of the tax transfers between the different levels of government have 
remained out of the protection provided by indexation. 
Advanced indexation practices, besides, do not avoid other important 
consequences of persistent inflation, especially the undermining of inspection 
routines. Inspection effectiveness is largely dependent on technical routines, 
devised to reconcile estimates with the real values underneath. The major part of 
indirect taxes is estimated and self-accounted by the taxpayers themselves and, 
under inflationary circumstances, the underestimation stands out. Previously 
fixed estimates, allowed by fiscal authorities in order to simplify tax gathering 
and to avoid generalised evasion, normally become undercorrected with time. 
The taxpayers may argue that a full indexation of estimates - apparently a 
neutral and recommendable practice - is not in accordance with the unstable 
economic results of their economic activities, proposing undervalued estimates 
instead. A huge variance in relative values and in business revenue flows is 
typical of inflationary periods, and in consequence the fiscal authorities are 
usually driven to excessive prudence both in the acceptance of estimated values 
and in the statement of taxable values. 
The extreme variability of relative prices also affects other taxing practices, 
as exemplified by the collecting mechanisms for property taxes. Real estate 
32 This has been a widespread practice in recent years. Social Security 
contributions, Vehicle Tax (in many states) and Urban Property Tax (in some 
municipalities; in many there are still unindexed intervals) adhered to full indexation, 
until the launching of the Real Plan in 1994. Maybe Sao Paulo's Value Added Tax is the 
most extreme case of indexation: in 1993 and 1994 firms were obliged to calculate the 
taxable values every ten days, immediately indexing them until the payment date (in the 
following month). 
values undergo a remarkable oscillation from one year to the next, and in order 
to avoid unfair taxation, or even litigation, the fiscal authorities are usually 
prone to adopt undervalued estimates when determining urban estate fiscal 
taxable prices, consequently undermining Urban Estate Tax and Urban Estate 
Sales Tax collection. 
Other effects of chronic inflation are more tangible, and although no testing 
and measurements have so far been carried out, it is important to be aware of 
them. Income Tax provides a good example of the role of institutional 
regulations and its discretionary influence on public revenues. Income Tax in 
Brazil is mainly a wage tax, collected by means of at-source deductions. To 
cope with the increase in the real tax burden produced by the rise in nominal 
wages, the collection is calculated in accordance with an official table, upgraded 
at variable intervals, which relates nominal wage brackets to taxing percentages. 
To keep the table fixed for a long time, or to underestimate the updating 
brackets, therefore raising the real burden, has been one of the most traditional 
tax policy tactics. 
Figure 1: Income Tax-Monthly Real Revenue, 1992-93 (Jan 92 = 100) 
It should be remembered that the absence of legal wage indexation has been 
a strong argument against the full indexation of the wage brackets within the 
official table. Even when informal agreements tended to protect real wages 
beyond the official legislative limits, the federal government stuck to the law 
and only in the middle of 1993 was special legislation passed providing 
automatic upgrading for the wage brackets, thereby softening the sharp rise in 
income tax revenues in real terms through the year. Figure I shows the increase 
in the monthly real amounts in 1992, and the consequences of automatic 
indexation in the following year. In both years, the variability of the monthly 
amounts far exceeds the variability of the real payrolls themselves. 
In the income tax example, inflation clearly favours public revenues, but this 
is an exceptional result rather than a normal one. The Value Added Tax 
provides the most outstanding example of the contrary and dominant trend, 
underlining the difficult management of taxing procedures under inflationary 
conditions. Yet, irrespective of inflation, this tax is complex to manage in 
Brazil. The comprehensiveness of its incidence, the great number of tax-payers, 
the deficiencies of the administrative staff in many states and, most importantly, 
the complete failure of the automatic mechanism of inspection, i.e. the check on 
receipts along the productive chain, make it one of the most troublesome taxes. 
The lack of traditions of fiscal responsibility and of tough inspection and 
punishment has weakened the practice of demanding and issuing receipts and, as 
a consequence, a tacit agreement among firms systematically understates taxable 
values, providing solid ground for fiscal evasion. For reasons of fiscal 
productivity in scarce resource conditions, the inspection procedures tend to 
concentrate on big firms. The consequence is that the contribution of small and 
medium size commercial enterprises to the fiscal revenues is far smaller than 
their contribution to the global value added. Again, unfortunately, no 
measurement of this disproportion has so far been attempted, but indirect clues 
are available, such as the heavy dependence of the tax revenue on a small 
number of big industrial enterprises, or the small amounts gathered by 
commercial activities. 
One might argue that industrial activities are more likely to add value than 
commercial activities, if we are to compare similar size firms (as measured by 
value of sales, capital etc). This argument should not be rejected, but it does not 
adequately reflect the size of the overrepresentation of big industrial firms and 
in fact hides another (and concealed) consequence of the inflationary process: 
price setting mechanisms under inflation entirely distort the accounting of value-
added itself, and, curiously, the value-added taxation process stimulates this 
distortion. This apparently surprising result becomes clear when we realise that 
price is an almost meaningless notion under high inflation, since real values are 
extremely dependent on terms. The major inter-firm disputes in Brazil have 
referred to terms, not to prices, and big retail commercial firms, which usually 
sell for cash and pay for their acquisitions 30-45 days later, have as their main 
strategy the bargaining of terms of payment, seeking to obtain minimal charges 
for nominal acquisition prices. Whenever they succeed in this strategy, the 
business is to sell cheap (relatively to nominal buying prices) and profit from 
high rates of interest in short-term investment. In such a case, the taxable added-
value, calculated by differences in nominal prices, will be low or even zero. The 
success of this peculiar price-setting mechanism obviously depends on other 
factors, including high rates of interest and a not very aggressive taxation of 
interest receipts; however, if these factors are present, the pricing mechanism 
converts added value and Value Added Tax into financial gains and smaller 
amounts of the Financial Transaction Tax. It is difficult to assess the effective 
impact of these practices, but given the enormous retail sales concentration in 
medium-size and large cities, it is far from negligible.33 
Retail pricing is a quite extreme example of the distortional consequences of 
inflation, because of its effects on value-added accounting, that is, on the very 
basis of tax incidence. It is not an isolated example, however, and the disturbing 
effect of high inflation on relative prices and incomes is widespread, providing 
several examples of the difficulties in operating taxation under inflationary 
circumstances. All the examples would contribute to the setting of indexation as 
a very limited countervailing tax-sustaining expedient, for very understandable 
general reasons: first of all, due to legal and practical barriers (accounting 
periods, administrative frictions etc) fiscal indexation cannot have a 
comprehensiveness comparable to that of the price and financial system in 
general; additionally, inflation produces allocative effects whose impacts on 
taxation can be presumed to be negative, though difficult to measure. 
The previous remarks might be seen as a general framework for the analysis 
of tax revenue time series, but also as a qualification on the conclusions relating 
inflation and revenues. Tax revenues reflect a broad set of economic and 
institutional facts, and simple explanations linking real revenues to inflation 
rates are undermined by the frequent environmental (legal) changes typical of 
inflationary periods. Changes in percentages, in indexation rules, in terms, in 
administrative procedures, have been common in Brazil. In the all-embracing 
picture of tax revenue performance, these institutional considerations must be 
added to the economic fluctuations and to the different rhythms of inflation. It is 
not easy to isolate all these effects, but in the absence of an accurate 
econometric decomposition of variables, a rough and simplified graphical 
analysis will be used to point out some important economic linkages behind the 
data. 
The six graphs below contrast the performance of specific taxes with the rate 
of inflation in the 1988-93 period. The revenue curves are constructed from 
monthly time series in real terms (expressed in 1993 cruzeiros) and the scales of 
absolute values (Cr$ x 103) are indicated on the right-hand vertical axis. The 
period encompasses three major institutional changes, namely, the new 
Constitution (valid from January 1989), the Summer Plan (beginning of 1989), 
and the Collor Plan (February 1990), and several minor institutional changes (in 
the indexation rules, in the time intervals between the taxable moment and 
actual tax collection etc.) also occurred. An important economic condition 
underlying the curves is the strong recession brought about by the Collor plan, 
with its effects spread out over 1991, 1992 and 1993. 
33 Some of the biggest supermarket stores have paid small or zero amounts of 
Value Added Tax in the last ten years. 
The first three graphs refer to the Value Added Tax (ICMS) in two 
important states, Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais, and in the whole set of Brazilian 
states respectively. In general, the revenue curves show that: 1. the Constitution 
- as far as the ICMS, fully implemented in the first semester of 1989, is 
concerned - changed the revenue plateau; 2. the Collor plan produced an 
extraordinary rise in taxes, thanks in part to the fall of inflation, but mainly as a 
result of one of its institutional peculiarities;34 3. the new ICMS plateau was 
eroded by recession and inflation, from 1991 on, returning to a level similar to 
the pre-constitutional period; 4. there is a visible inverse relationship between 
the inflation curve and the revenue curve. Inflationary peaks coincide with 
revenue decreases, whereas abrupt falls in the rate of inflation, typical of the 
start of anti-inflationary plans, produce revenue peaks. Apart from the sharp 
kinks, clearly correlated with the stabilisation plans, the up and down pattern of 
the revenue curves seems to be (inversely) related to inflation. 
Figure 2: Value Added Tax Revenue (ICMS) in Real Terms and Rate of Inflation, 
1988-93 (Minas Gerais) 
34 The Collor plan put in the hands of the Central Bank all private (firms and 
individuals) bank deposits above a very low level, thus turning everyone illiquid at once. 
One of the few legal ways to use the frozen deposits was to pay taxes and tax debts. 
Needless to say, this allowance produced an excess of payments to the Treasury and 
explains the extreme upward movement of the revenue curves. 
Figure 3: Value Added Tax Revenue in Real Terms (ICMS) and Rate of Inflation, 
1988-93 (Sao Paulo) 
Figure 4: Value Added Tax Revenue in Real Terms (ICMS) and Rate of Inflation, 
1988-93 (all states) 
The next three graphs (Figures 5-7), referring to federal taxes, do not show 
the same strong inverse relation between inflationary movement and the revenue 
curves, apart from the kinks produced by the two stabilisation plans. The 
inflationary trend might be said to influence the curves indirectly, in the sense 
that the federal government was able to implement countervailing measures -
e.g. changes in the indexation criteria, in terms, in percentages - not in the 
hands of other authorities, thus preserving the real federal resources from the 
full negative effects of inflation; however, the revenue cycles are less strongly 
related to the inverse movements of the inflation curve. 
The main conclusions to be gathered from the federal tax behaviour are: 1. 
both Income Tax and the Industrial Products Tax, as well as the total tax 
revenue curves, fluctuated around the same level throughout the 1988-93 
period; that is, federal taxes exhibited an extraordinary performance, taking into 
account inflation and recession; 2. surprisingly, in view of its concentration in a 
few industrial branches, the Industrial Products Tax was not so severely affected 
by the widespread industrial recession at the beginning of the 1990s; 3. federal 
taxes are negatively related to inflation. 
Figure 5: Income Tax in Real Terms and Rate of Inflation, 1988-93 (Brazil) 
Figure 6: Industrial Products Tax Revenue in Real Terms and Rate of Inflation, 
1988-93 (Brazil) 
Figure 7: Total Tax Revenue in Real Terms and Rate of Inflation, 1988-93 (Brazil) 
The main characteristic of all the taxes shown is their extreme fluctuation. 
Since the fluctuations do not coincide with seasonal effects, and are far from 
being explained by movements in the economic growth rate, inflation and 
institutional measures should be given a large part of the responsibility. 
Although this paper concentrates on the revenue side, brief remarks on 
public expenditure are a necessary complement to the above comments on 
inflation. Time series deflated by the General Price Index (or by any other price 
index) do not really express the purchasing power of fiscal revenues, for two 
reasons. First, the intra-monthly distribution of expenditures and revenues is not 
even, and this is important whenever inflation exceeds 10% a month, as has 
frequently happened in Brazil since 1985. This means that time series which 
presume monthly averages - and all of them presume it, since the public 
accounting procedures require only monthly statements - can deliver only a 
rough approximation to purchasing power. The concern of all government 
managers with daily cash flow controls, in order to maximise revenues in 
relation to expenditures in real terms, illustrates the importance of intra-monthly 
flows. 
The second reason is even more important. Typical governmental 
acquisitions include goods that do not have fully indexed prices. Except for 
public debt servicing, the most important expenditure item within states, 
municipalities and Union budgets is the salary bill (including public employees' 
pensions). While wages in the private sector were never fully indexed before the 
URV experiment at the beginning of 1994, salaries in the public sector have 
been even less protected from inflation. In general, wage legislation does not 
apply to public servants, and seldom have Brazilian governments put its public 
employees under any protective rule. On the contrary, apart from a few 
exceptional cases, public sector wages are usually ruled by entirely ad hoc 
criteria, which on many occasions have produced a devastating impact on real 
incomes. 
One might say that public sector wage bills are not determined entirely by 
updating rules, but also by new jobs and some other factors, e.g. promotions, 
benefits dependent on the simple elapsing of time, which increase the nominal 
payroll even in the absence of any indexation rule. This is true but, at any rate, 
what matters to the above argument is that inflation and the absence of 
enforceable regulations together have put in the hands of public authorities a 
powerful real price determination mechanism, concerning the most important 
item of public expenditure.35 
35 If we were to include social security expenditures in our analysis, similar 
conclusions would apply since pensions are imperfectly indexed. But the absence of 
indexation also affects social security revenues. 
By contrast, the prices of other public goods cannot be submitted to the same 
strict control. Public sector purchases are governed by time-consuming legal 
procedures and more generally by nominal price conditions. Prices above the 
normal market level are a natural consequence and, although no systematic 
public/private buying price comparison is available, there is evidence of 
overpricing in governmental purchasing. 
In short, high inflation itself challenges the effectiveness of taxation, but the 
net effect, or what I have called the purchasing power of public revenues, 
depends not only on the real tax revenue, but also on the real prices of public 
goods, or their relative price compared to revenues and to prices paid by the 
private sector. A more authoritative conclusion on the final impact of inflation 
on public budgets would have to include both sides - expenditures and revenues 
- and further investigation on relative prices and taxation; that is, it would have 
to include allocation effects and relative price analysis. 
Federal versus state revenues: overall performance 
Since the main target of the 1988 Constitution has been the strengthening of 
states and municipalities, at the expense of the Union, it is useful to have a look 
at the overall balance of revenues. Table 3 compares the Value Added Tax 
(ICMS - all states included) with the sum of federal taxes and with the sum of 
federal taxes plus Finsocial, the most important and tax-like contribution, 
excluding social security taxes. It can be seen that an immediate (and 
predictable) post-constitutional increase in the ICMS/Federal Taxes ratio was 
followed by a sharp decline in 1992 and 1993, which confirms that federal and 
states' fiscal revenues have had different performances within the period. If we 
include Finsocial, the fluctuations in the ratio are less marked. 
Table 3 
Federal Tax (FT), Finsocial (F) and Value Added Tax (ICMS) in Real Terms 
ANNUAL AMOUNTS, 1988-93 
1 2 3 4 5 
FT F ICMS ICMS/FT ICMS/F 
3/1 3/2 
1988 2760 3009 2101 0.76 0.70 
1989 2735 3095 2590 0.95 0.84 
1990 3415 4007 2881 0.84 0.72 
1991 2537 3085 2750 1.08 0.89 
1992 2530 2888 2489 0.99 0.86 
1993 2505 2926 2127 0.85 0.73 
Source: Boletim do Banco Central do Brasil 
(Values in 1993 Cr$ 1000) 
These results underline two important achievements of the post-88 tax 
system. First, the federal contributions, as well as the social security revenues, 
have been favoured by the Union as the most revenue-effective elements, a quite 
foreseeable result since these are not shared with states. The federal government 
preferred to concentrate its revenue efforts in the Finsocial and Financial 
Operations Tax (IOF) field, in order to avoid the sharing of revenues. Secondly, 
since inflation itself has exerted an important negative effect on ICMS, the 
objectives of the 1988 Constitution have been in practice overturned. Table 4 
shows the evolution of the Value Added Tax for a group of representative states 
in the hyper-inflationary 1988-93 period. For many important states, the ICMS 
amounts in 1993 were almost similar to the 1988 position. It may be argued that, 
owing to high inflation, 1988 is not a representative year; however, the losses 
imposed by inflation after 1991 cannot be denied. 
Table 4 









Bahia Goias MG 
Sul 
Amazonas Brasil 
1988 871 201 213 163 100 49 10 24 2101 
1989 1074 235 234 209 104 62 32 44 2590 
1990 1154 264 270 224 126 69 38 53 2881 
1991 1039 264 280 208 117 72 43 45 2717 
1992 954 254 260 196 113 67 42 33 2498 
1993 901 231 230 193 110 58 36 32 2334 
Source: Boletim do Banco Central do Brasil 
(Values in 1993 Cr$ 1000) 
Yet, as Table 5 suggests, the federal taxes have been more resilient to 
inflationary erosion, either because there have been frequent and decisive 
changes in the sharing of revenues, or due to the federal government's agility in 
legal and administrative matters and to the nature of the taxes under 
consideration. It is important to note that agility, e.g. changes in percentages, 
changes in taxing rules, so decisive in unstable periods, are more likely to be 
carried out at the level of the Union for one simple reason: only the federal 
government has the legal ability to rule on items such as indexation criteria, and 
enforceable indices of monetary upgrading. States and municipalities tend to 
follow the federal procedures, and delays in adapting to the changeable 
indexation rules, provided by almost all stabilisation plans, are common. 
Table 5 
IR IPI IOF IIMP TOTAL FINSOC 
1988 1471 720 140 140 2760 249 
1989 1497 841 78 180 2735 360 
1990 1782 890 564 45 3415 593 
1991 1306 839 217 142 2537 548 
1992 1268 844 239 161 2530 358 
1993 1423 896 279 160 2762 473 
Source: Banco Central do Brasil 
(Values in 1993 Cr$ 1000) 
It must also be remembered that, unlike the ICMS, federal taxes have more 
flexible rules. We have already seen the extreme variability of the Income Tax 
real burden, thanks to delays in the upgrading of the incidence brackets. The 
Financial Transactions Tax (IOF) is also very manageable under inflationary 
conditions, and IOF enhancing has proved to be one of the favourite federal 
government alternatives, because this tax is an automatic by-product of both 
inflation and high levels of interest rates.36 On the whole, and in spite of the 
adverse impact of inflation on taxes in general, Table 5 shows Union revenue 
has been much more protected against inflation than the states' and 
municipalities' budgets, while it should also be remembered that transfers to 
states and municipalities are devalued by inflation. 
Of course, the relative success of the Union's tax-raising strategies produces 
effects that stimulate unfairness and inadequacy within the Brazilian tax system. 
We have already mentioned the extreme variability of the personal income tax 
burden, and it is easy to infer that the absence of stable rules undermines equity 
objectives in tax collection. In its turn, the Financial Transactions Tax (IOF), 
conceived as a complement to interest rate policies, has been transformed into 
an important and almost indispensable fund-raising instrument.37 The IOF raises 
the real cost of loans and its final incidence is quite uncertain, because a great 
part of its burden falls on prices and consumers in general. Finally, the Finsocial 
(calculated upon gross sales), in addition to the Social Security Taxes and other 
contributions which fall on wage costs, increases the importance of regressive 
36 It has been a special aim of federal authorities to boost Finsocial, but very 
complex litigation and a strong anti-Finsocial campaign, led by businessmen, proved to 
be harmful to the government's attempts. The long lasting judicial dispute would be 
overcome only in 1994. 
37 The Share of IOF in the total sum of federal taxes (excluding contributions and 
social security) was as follows: 1988:5.09%; 1989: 2.85%; 1990: 16.51%; 1991: 8.54%; 
1992: 9.45%; 1993: 10.0%. 
taxes. To foster a tax collecting strategy which favours such contributions 
entirely undermines equitative concerns. 
Summing up, it may be said that inflation and revenue-protecting schemes 
have overturned the federal purposes of the Constitution, and have created 
distortions in the allocation of resources and in the pursuit of equity. 
Furthermore, they have introduced unpredictability as the main characteristic of 
the tax system. Almost all monthly real tax series show an erratic movement that 
is well beyond what might be attributed to seasonal and product-related causes. 
In such an unstable environment, budget forecasting is an activity that cannot 
take account of the real outcomes of taxation. The criteria - administrative 
efficiency and fairness - that usually guide fiscal analysis, and should guide 
government actions, is almost totally absent during inflationary periods. 
Equity and allocation concerns: a preliminary statement 
Value Added Tax is the most important of all Brazilian taxes and its size is 
sufficient to bring the whole structure towards an indirect tax-based system. 
Table 6 presents the Income Tax (IR) / (Federal Taxes+ICMS) ratio as a proxy 
for measuring the share of direct taxes within the tax system. The Federal Taxes 
(FR) are the sum of Industrial Product Tax (IPI), Taxes on Financial 
Transactions (IOF), Taxes on Investments (I.IMP) and Finsocial (FINS); the 
final column shows the ratio of income tax to the sum of federal taxes and 
ICMS. The results could not be more harmful to equity.38 
Table 6 
Direct and Indirect Taxation in Real Terms 
I II III IV V VI v n 
IR IPI IOF LIMP FINS ICMS IR/(FR+ICMS) 
(I/IL..VI) 
1988 1471 720 140 140 249 2101 0.31 
1989 1497 841 78 180 360 2590 0.27 
1990 1782 890 564 45 593 2881 0.26 
1991 1306 839 217 142 548 2717 0.23 
1992 1268 844 239 161 358 2498 0.24 
1993 1423 891 279 160 473 2334 0.26 
Source: Boletim do Banco Central do Brasil 
(Values in 1993 Cr$ 1000) 
38 In fact, the heading Income Tax includes taxation of firms, as well as other 
elements that should not be automatically treated as direct taxation; however, personal 
incomes are dominant. On the other hand, the exclusion of other direct taxes does not 
affect the conclusions, since they are irrelevant. The federal taxes listed in Table 6 
represent more than 90% of the overall federal tax revenues. 
It might be argued that inclusion of social security funding would turn the 
balance in favour of direct taxation. However, direct taxation in the strict sense 
(deductions from wages) represents less than 50% of social security revenues, 
and, besides, this is only marginally progressive in fiscal terms. The social 
security funding is mainly provided by employers' payroll contributions and 
some other indirect taxes.39 
The relative importance of indirect taxes would also not be reversed by 
including municipal taxes, since those municipal taxes that are strictly direct 
(e.g. Urban Estate Tax and Fuel Retail Sales Tax) are counterbalanced by the 
Service Tax, an almost fully indirect tax and a quite significant one for the 
budgets of large cities. In any case, the share of municipal revenues in the whole 
system is not supposed to exceed 6%, if we include Social Security Tax in the 
overall account.40 
From an international perspective, the regressiveness of the Brazilian tax 
system is also explained by the negligible importance of wealth taxes and, to a 
greater extent, by the unprogressive character of income tax. An excessively 
restricted range of income tax payers and of personal incomes taxed narrows a 
source of revenue which, in many countries, is of the utmost importance and 
adds some progressivity to the fiscal system.41 The extremely high share of the 
Value Added Tax (including the Industrial Products Tax) plus Finsocial in the 
total revenue is, in a way, a consequence of the low level of income tax receipts 
in Brazil. 
Only a more aggressive approach to wealth taxes and to income tax would 
allow Brazilian governments to reduce tax yields from regressive (or at least 
non-progressive) Value Added Tax and Services Tax, as well as to alleviate the 
high burden of the numerous wage-bill based taxes. The reduction of Value 
Added Tax rates and a revision in the extremely high incidence of payroll taxes 
seem to be general demands; however, such changes have to be counterbalanced 
by an increase in direct and progressive taxation, and this has so far been a 
taboo theme. 
39 The social security system deserves special treatment, when equity is the main 
concern. However, the analysis would necessarily have to encompass expenses (social 
security pensions and medical expenses), because the main redistributive problems are 
located on this side. This task goes well beyond my purpose in this paper. 
40 In the period 1991-1992 the figure was 5.6%. This share was calculated from 
aggregate information on the gross burden of taxes (Union, states, municipalities, 
contributions) as percentage of GDP. According to the same criteria, the share of the 
state revenues would be 33% (ICMS: 28%). However, these results should be treated 
with caution, because they were not gathered from monthly deflated time series; for the 
same reason, they are not necessarily consistent with data presented in this paper. 
41 Taxes on income and profits as a percentage of total taxation (including social 
security) in OECD countries in 1992 varied from 17.3% (France) to 59.5% (Denmark), 
with the average being 37.0%. Source: Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries 
(OECD, 1994). 
The insistence on the importance of wealth taxes, although they perform a 
secondary role in almost all countries, results from a sceptical approach to the 
possibilities of increasing the progressiveness of income tax. Income tax is 
mainly a wage tax in Brazil, and progressiveness seems to have been pushed to 
a limit within these boundaries. The difficulties in changing this picture become 
clear when we realise that an important (but impossible to be measured) part of 
personal incomes is not made up of explicit wage incomes. I do not refer to the 
fringe benefits for high salary earners, but to the large amount of unassessable 
personal incomes, inherent in the so-called 'informal economy', and, to a greater 
but unmeasurable extent, to the confused personal/entrepreneurial income 
entanglements that characterise small and medium-size business. Many small 
firms owners evade income tax, by disguising their personal incomes as 
entrepreneurial revenues, or simply hiding considerable amounts of their firm's 
revenues, later transferred to personal use, by means of false accounting records. 
As in any country, an effective inspection would necessarily have to include a 
thorough control of money flows, financial assets and personal properties in 
general, a task systematically undermined by the Brazilian judiciary.42 Income 
tax enforcement is highly dependent on property value estimates connected to 
wealth tax records and financial controls in general. 
It is easy to find other evidence on the unfairness of the Brazilian tax system; 
since it is difficult to increase the tax yield by exploiting the same taxpayers and 
taxing mechanisms, Brazil's unfair tax system has an obvious macroeconomic 
impact, in addition to its impact on equity. Nonetheless, I will not insist on 
classical equity issues, partly due to the lack of solid empirical evidence, and 
partly because some considerations on allocative effects may prove to be more 
helpful for an eventual construction of a framework to analyse equity. 
First, it is important to consider the impact of inflation. It has already been 
pointed out that inflation distorts pricing mechanisms to such an extent that it 
becomes impossible to predict relative prices. The same rationale applies to all 
incomes, making it in consequence extremely tricky to think of relative incomes 
(and taxes) and equity. Furthermore, since prices cannot contribute much to 
inter-firm competition under inflationary conditions, supply and demand 
elasticities, which are supposed to determine the relation between taxes, prices 
and final burdens, lose a clear-cut meaning. 
Secondly - and returning to tax evasion - a more authoritative conclusion 
about vertical equity (and progressivity) always takes acceptable patterns of 
42 This is another taboo theme. For obvious reasons, there is only anecdotal 
evidence about evasion, but no one denies it is widespread. Some newspapers have 
reported that inspection of imported cars, carried out in 1994, proved a great proportion 
of owners had not paid income tax or filled in the forms, which means they either ignore 
their fiscal responsibilities or do not admit to earn the minimum taxable threshold. The 
relevance of the story stands out when we match the minimum tax threshold (much less 
than US$ 1,000 monthly) with the price of imported cars (not less than US$ 20,000). 
horizontal equity for granted. Taxpayers are supposed to pay taxes in 
accordance with the letter of the law, given their economic situation. With 
current levels of fiscal evasion, however, no one can be sure that taxpayers 
under similar economic conditions or participating in similar economic activities 
pay taxes on an even basis. Few taxes are enforced in accordance with the 
underlying economic values and in the Brazilian case this does not mean an 
excess of legal loopholes, but simply evasion. Most probably, only that part of 
income tax deducted at source, the part of the Social Security Tax paid by wage-
earners (also deducted at source), Vehicle Tax and Fuel Retail Sales Tax are 
efficiently enforced. The first two are usually wage-subtracted taxes and the 
other two are examples of easily enforceable taxes. 
Because of its importance, Value Added Tax is a strong case of lack of 
horizontal equity. Thanks to generalised cheating in the issuance of receipts, 
inspection routines are ineffective, and a large inequality in cost conditions is to 
be expected, since the taxpayers in this case are firms. Inter-firm competition is 
strongly affected by the variance between sale prices and tax costs, which adds 
strong allocative considerations to a subject that was primarily one of equity. 
Some firms pay Value Added Tax, while their competitors do not. Tax evasion 
reinforces different capabilities within the same markets, and provides a 
protective cushion for inefficient firms. 
The same conclusion applies to an important range of much evaded taxes, 
e.g. Service Tax, Finsocial, Social Security Tax (partly paid by the employers), 
and income tax (except for the wage-deducted part), to such an extent as to 
make difficult any conclusion about fairness. That is, owing to evasion, taxation 
exerts an uneven and unpredictable impact over the whole income and price 
system. The consequences are not only damaging to overall economic 
performance and to tax revenue efficacy, but to transparency and equality before 
the law in general. Since these provide the very basis of a democratic system, it 
is not difficult to conclude that the symbolic contribution of the Brazilian tax 
system to public standards of life has been very low. 
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